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Better Incentives Data Can
Inform Both Research and Policy
Timothy J. Bartik
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Incentives tripled from 1990
to 2015, increasing from 9
percent of state/local business
taxes to 30 percent.
n Incentives often vary
by a factor of 2 or 3 to 1
across nearby states, for no
clear economic reason and
with no obvious economic
consequences.
n States underinvest
in customized business
services and overinvest
in tax incentives for
low-wage businesses and
long-term incentives.
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In March 2017 the Upjohn Institute released
a new, publicly accessible database on economic
development incentives, which are those offered
by state and local governments as their “usual
deal” to entice a business to locate a new facility.
(The database is housed on the Upjohn Institute’s
website: www.upjohn.org/models/bied/home.php.)
These incentives include property tax abatements,
job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and
R&D tax credits. They also include customized
job training programs, under which community
colleges provide a new facility with training for new
workers that is customized to the facility’s needs.
No other study of incentives is as comprehensive
in covering diverse industries and lengthy time
periods. Using data from 1990 to 2015, the “Panel
Database on Incentives and Taxes” estimates
marginal business taxes and business incentives for
45 industries in 33 states; the industries compose 91
percent of U.S. labor compensation, and the states
produce over 92 percent of U.S. economic output.
The database has data for a new facility starting
up in each of 26 “start years.” Compared to prior
studies, the new database provides more incentive
details, such as how incentives are broken down
by different incentive types (e.g., job creation tax
credits vs. property tax abatements), and the time
pattern by which incentives are paid out over a
facility’s life cycle.
The purpose of this new database is to help
researchers and policymakers learn more about
incentives and their effectiveness. Without
knowing how different incentives vary over time
and across industries for different states, it is
impossible to conduct any meaningful incentives
research or to subject incentives to any informed
public debate. Do incentive differences across
states, industries, or time lead to any significant
effects on an industry’s growth in a state? Do
incentives allocate more U.S. growth to needier
areas or to industries that might boost national

productivity? Without incentives data, such
questions cannot begin to be addressed.
In addition to being downloadable, the database
is analyzed in an accompanying report (Bartik
2017) that focuses on 31 “export-base” industries,
which are those that sell their goods and services
outside the state but not necessarily outside the
country. Such industries provide the base for a

The typical state does little industry
targeting—for example, higherwage industries do not receive
significantly higher incentives.
state’s economy by bringing new money into the
state. This article highlights the main findings in
the report.
Incentives are Large Compared to State and
Local Business Taxes but Modest as a Share of
Overall Costs
Incentives for the average state’s base industries
in 2015 offset around 30 percent of what otherwise
would be charged in state and local business taxes.
Incentives play a significant role in state and local
taxes and budgets.
On the other hand, incentives for base
industries average about 1.4 percent of business
value-added, a measure of the value of the
business’s production. (Business value-added
is defined as the business’s sales minus what it
purchases from other businesses.) Incentives can
be offset by modest variations in other business
costs, such as wages.
Incentives Tripled from 1990 to 2015
Average incentives increased from 9 percent of
business taxes in 1990 to 30 percent in 2015. As
shown in Figure 1, this increase was most rapid
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in the 1990s. In the past decade, some
states have significantly expanded
incentives while other states have made
cuts.
Incentives Vary Greatly across
Nearby States, with No Obvious
Strong Correlation with a State’s
Economic Past or Future
As shown in Figure 2, incentives
often vary by a factor of 2 to 1 or
more across nearby states. These
incentive differences are not tied to a
state’s unemployment, so incentives
are not reallocating jobs to high
unemployment areas.
Incentive differences do not appear
to have large effects on state economic
growth by industry. The database
suggests incentive effects toward the
low end of prior estimates: the average
incentive package, 1.4 percent of valueadded, might tip the location decision
of 6 percent of incented businesses—
the other 94 percent of the time, the

state would have experienced similar
growth without the incentive.
This typical 6 percent tip rate of
incentives is a low batting average.
To have benefits greater than costs,
incentives must do something special—
they either need unusually high
benefits per job created, or incentive
designs must exceed the typical batting
average, lowering costs per job created.
Higher benefits per incented job
can be achieved if incentives target
high-wage or high-tech industries.
High-wage industries obviously are
good for those industries’ workers. In
addition, because higher-wage workers
have more income to spend at local
retailers, such industries will have
higher multiplier effects in creating
other local jobs. Because high-tech
industries tend to cluster, incented
high-tech jobs might also have higher
multipliers, with each induced hightech job creating five other local jobs
(Moretti 2010).

Figure 1 Incentives as a Percent of Business Taxes, 1990–2015
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NOTE: Chart shows the average magnitude of state and local business incentives as a percent of state and local
business taxes, 1990–2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Incentives Vary Little
across Industries
Even though some industries offer
much greater benefits, the typical
state does little industry targeting.
As shown in Figure 3, higher-wage
industries do not receive significantly
higher incentives. Incentives do not
particularly target high-tech, as each
extra 10 percent of industry R&D
spending only increases incentives by
0.3 percent.
Incentives are Excessively Long Term
Incentives are more effective if they
are more up front. Because business
executives tend to think in the short
term, an incentive today is more
effective at inducing location decisions
than an incentive that is only paid out
10 years from now. The average state
has incentives that are still 1.1 percent
of business value-added when a
facility is in its tenth year of operation.
Reducing such long-term incentives
would lower long-term government
costs of incentives without having
much effect on job creation.
States Underinvest in Customized
Business Services
Incentives designed as customized
services may be more effective than tax
incentives. For example, customized
job training is a very effective incentive.
Research suggests that, per dollar,
customized job training might be 10
times more effective than tax incentives
in encouraging local business growth
(Hollenbeck [2008]; Hoyt, Jepsen, and
Troske [2008]; see also Holzer et al.
[1993]). Other effective customized
services include manufacturing
extension programs, which have been
shown to improve productivity (Jarmin
1998).
Why are such customized services
more cost-effective? They tend to be
more targeted than tax incentives at
small and medium-sized businesses,
whose location and expansion behavior
is easier to affect than large businesses’.
Because obtaining quality job training
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Summary
While these conclusions are based
on preliminary analysis of the “Panel
Database on Incentives and Taxes,”
the database allows for much more
extensive examinations of different
types of incentives for each state for
diverse industries. Such detailed
analyses can play an important role
in the growing national movement
toward subjecting incentives to
greater transparency, evaluation, and
accountability. According to the Pew
Charitable Trusts (2016), “Since 2012,
22 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted laws requiring regular,
rigorous, independent evaluation of tax
incentives.” In addition, in 2015, the
Governmental Accounting Standards
Board adopted a new reporting
standard, GASB 77, under which state
and local governments that comply
with “generally accepted accounting
principles” must annually report at least
the aggregate revenue foregone from
each tax incentive program (Good Jobs
First 2015). The database complements
GASB 77 reports by providing more
long-term and industry-detailed
information on incentives. It supports
state incentive evaluations by
facilitating comparisons across states,
industries, and incentive types. With
better data and evaluation of incentives,
state and local governments over time
can reform such incentives to increase
their benefits for state residents relative
to costs.

Figure 2 Incentives across Nearby States as a Percent of Value-Added, 2015
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NOTE: Chart shows state and local business incentives as a percent of business value-added across three pairs
of adjacent states as of 2015.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

Figure 3 Comparison of Incentives vs. Wages across Industries, as of 2015
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services or business advice may be
difficult for smaller businesses to
do on their own, the value of such
services may exceed their costs. Finally,
customized services provide up-front
assistance, helping the business be
more productive immediately.
However, despite the greater costeffectiveness of customized services,
state and local incentives are more
focused on tax incentives. For example,
the typical state only spends $1 on
customized job training for every $20
devoted to tax incentives.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

U

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

Wages/FTE (annual $)
NOTE: Each dot represents 1 of 31 export-base industries. The vertical axis shows the national average for state
and local business incentives for that industry, as a percent of that industry’s value-added. The horizontal
axis shows the industry’s average wages per full-time equivalent worker.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Working Longer,
Retiring Later
Are Employers Ready for the New Employment Trend?
Robert L. Clark and Melinda Sandler Morrill
Policy analysts, economists, and
demographers argue that individuals
must extend their work lives if they
are to achieve their desired standards
of living in retirement. Increases in
longevity imply that those who leave
the labor force at traditional retirement
ages must either save more during
their working careers or consume less
during their retirement.
The logic behind later retirement
from the employee’s perspective is
clear and has been studied in detail:
remaining in the labor force for
additional years is needed to support
increasing years in retirement.
However, relatively few studies have
directly addressed how employers
feel about having workers remain on
the job until older ages. Our book,
Extending Work Life: Can Employers
Adapt When Employees Want to Delay
Retirement?, which was recently
published by the Upjohn Institute
(see p. 7), seeks to fill this gap by
providing a comprehensive assessment
of the costs and benefits to employers
of accommodating later retirement
ages. Through their employment and
compensation policies, employers can
either assist or restrict workers’ ability
to remain on the job.
Economic theory of the firm
indicates that companies determine
the optimal number of workers to

hire and the appropriate age and skill
composition of their workforces. A
firm will need a mix of employees of
different skill types, skill levels, and
vintages of human capital. Changes in
the age structure of a firm’s workforce
due to delayed retirement can affect
labor costs, productivity, profitability,
and sustainability. Companies develop
their compensation policies to attract,
retain, motivate, and ultimately retire
their desired workforces. As a result,
shifts in worker preferences may lead
to changes in company policies.
Employers must consider the
advantages and costs of retaining
or hiring older workers. Older
workers often are relatively highly
compensated, and some will experience
diminished productivity at older ages.
Furthermore, as employers retain
older workers, the opportunities for
advancement by younger workers
might be restricted. Employers must
address the changing demographics
in their workforces. By creating
compensation and employment
policies to accommodate prolonged
or delayed retirement transitions,
employers will be better positioned to
reap the benefits of employing older
workers.
What factors influence a firm’s
willingness to retain older workers?
Can companies develop transitional

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Between 1994 and 2014, the labor force participation rate for men aged 65–69 rose
from 27 to 36 percent.
n By creating compensation and employment policies to accommodate prolonged or
delayed retirement transitions, employers will be better positioned to reap the benefits
of employing older workers.

